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Abstract
This paper addresses the following questions. Is there evidence of
ﬁnancial contagion in the Eurozone? To what extent a country's vul-
nerability to contagion depends on fundamentals as opposed the gov-
ernment's credibility? We look at the empirical evidence on European
sovereigns CDS spreads and estimate an econometric model where a cru-
cial role is played by time varying parameters. We model CDS spread
changes at country level as reﬂecting three diﬀerent factors: a Global
sovereign risk factor, a European sovereign risk factor and a Financial
intermediaries risk factor. Our main ﬁndings are as follows. First, Un-
like the US subprime crisis which aﬀected all European sovereign risks,
the Greek crisis is largely a matter concerning the Euro Zone. Second,
diﬀerences in vulnerability to contagion within the Eurozone are even
more remarkable: the core Eurozone members become less vulnerable
to EUZ contagion, possibly due to a safe-heaven eﬀect, while peripheric
countries become more vulnerable. Finally, market fundamentals go a
long way in explaining these diﬀerences: they jointly explain between
54 and 80% of the cross-country variation in idiosyncratic risks and in
the vulnerability to contagion, largely supporting the wake-up call hy-
pothesis according to which market participants become more wary of
market fundamentals during ﬁnancial crises.
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1 Introduction
Even before the Euro began to circulate in 2002, it achieved a remarkable com-
pression of interest diﬀerentials in the Eurozone. The sudden elimination of
exchange risks and the following convergence of government bond yields lead
to huge windful interest savings for high debt countries. Between 2000 and
2005 the interest spread between Greek and German bonds eﬀectively van-
ished, reaching a minimum of 18 basis points; similarly, interest payments in
Italy collapsed from almost 12% of GDP in 1996 to less than 5% in 2006. With
the beneﬁt of hindsight, these gains were largely dissipated as the European
institutional safeguards that should have insured ﬁscal discipline (the Stability
and Growth Pact) proved ineﬀective. Yet, for more than a decade ﬁnancial
markets failed to impose any discipline, pricing higher premia for governments
pursuing unsound ﬁscal policies and/or countries running unsustainable cur-
rent account deﬁcits. It was only after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008, and most notably with the onset of the Greek sovereign debt
crisis in late 2009, that markets realized that the Euzone membership did not
imply a full guarantee against insolvency, and that permanence in the Euro
area could not to be taken for granted for many highly indebted countries.
The Greek crisis erupted in late 2009 when the neo-elected government of
George Papandreou revised the estimate for the budget deﬁcit-GDP ratio from
7.5 to an alarming 13.5 per cent. Two years later, the EU-IMF-ECB troika
agreed with bondholders on a large restructuring of Greek debt which imposed
an heavy haircut on the private sector, estimated at 75 percent in present
value terms, but failed to reassure markets about Greece's permanence in the
Eurozone. Portugal, and Ireland have since lost market access and were bailed
out by the troika. Spain has resorted to European Financial Stability Fund
(EFSF) in order to recapitalize its banking sector, and Spain (and Italy?) may
apply to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and/or to the Outright
Monetary Transaction intervention of the ECB, in order to curb the rise in
interest rates. While government bold yields and CDS spreads were rising
sharply in the EU periphery, contagion became the buzzword of the day. In
fact, in many peripheral countries, politicians have blamed ﬁnancial markets
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for deliberately attacking the Eurozone, and their own country in particular.
This paper addresses the following questions. Is there evidence of contagion
in the Eurozone? To what extent do sovereign risk and the vulnerability to
contagion depend on fundamentals as opposed to a country's credibility (e.g.
Monti vs Berlusconi)?
There are two sides in this debate. In the literature on speculative attacks,
the fundamentalist view is associated to the ﬁrst generation models of bal-
ance of payment crises stemming from Krugman (1979), where speculative at-
tacks only hasten home the delivery of the bad news: economic fundamentals
(monetary ﬁnancing of the ﬁscal deﬁcit) are incompatible with ﬁxed exchange
rates. Similarly, in the sudden stops literature pioneered by Calvo (1998),
capital ﬂow reversals due to unsustainable external positions trigger an abrupt
current account reversal. More generally, this view suggests that in order to
prevent such crise economic policies should directed at correcting structural
imbalances with a view to long term growth. On the other side, the credibil-
ity view is based on the idea of multiple equilibria pioneered by the Diamond
and Dybvig's (1983) model of bank runs, and popularized by Obstfeld's (1986)
model of second generation speculative attacks. If market come to expect a
future devaluation, they require higher interest rates to cover depreciation and
this makes it optimal for the government to abandon the peg and depreciate
to boost the economy, thus fulﬁlling markets' expectations. In this framework,
a front loaded adjustment may enable the goverment to focus market expec-
tations on the good equilibrium of low interest rates and sustainble currency
peg. In other models market fundamentals and sunspots interact to generate
multiple equilibria (see Alesina, Prati and Tabellini, 1989). On the theory side,
Morris and Shin in a series of contributions, see for example Morris and Shin
1998, show that when agents information sets diﬀer slightly, and each individ-
ual receives an idiosyncratic signal on market fundamentals, multiple equilibra
collapse to a unique equilibrium, which is ultimately determined by market fun-
damentals: In the empirical literature, Goldstein's (1998) introduced the idea
of wake up call: a crisis in one country makes investors suddenly aware of
existing problems elsewhere, an example being the role of Thailand in focusing
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investors' attention on unsustainable current account positions in other East
Asian countries.
This paper tries to shed some light on these issues by looking at the em-
pirical evidence on EU sovereigns CDS spreads. We estimate an econometric
model, building on Bekaert et al. (2009), where the crucial role is played by
time varying parameters. We model CDS spread changes at country level as
reﬂecting three diﬀerent factors: a Global sovereign risk factor, a European
sovereign risk factor and a Financial intermediaries risk factor. Our main ﬁnd-
ings are as follows. First, while the US subprime crisis aﬀects all European
sovereign risks, albeit with diﬀerent magnitudes due to the role of ﬁnancial
institutions in each country (Ireland, Austria and the UK being the most af-
fected), the Greek crisis is largely a matter concerning the Euro Zone. Second,
diﬀerences in vulnerability to contagion in the Eurozone are remarkable: in
particular France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Ireland and Portugal show large and
recurrent spikes in idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, after the Greek crisis the core
Eurozone members become less vulnerable to EUZ contagion, possibly due to
a safe-heaven eﬀect, while peripheric countries become more vulnerable.Third,
market fundamentals go a long way in explaining these diﬀerences. In fact, dur-
ing crisis time, market fundamentals matter more than during normal times.
Variables such as the domestic debt GDP ratio, the growth rate of industrial
production and the rate of unemployment which were largely irrelevant before
the crisis, become important during the crisis. Also, changes in the country's
sovereign rating, which were not statistically signiﬁcant in normal times, do
aﬀect idiosyncratic and contagion risk in crisis time, as markets scramble for
new information. Market fundamentals jointly explain between 54 and 80%
of the cross-country variation in idiosyncratic risks and in the vulnerability
to contagion, largely supporting the view that fundamentals matter and that
wake-up calls are delivered in times of crisis. It then follows that a front
loaded, cold-turkey, adjustment which may be desirable for the purpose of im-
proving credibility, may backﬁre by imposing a heavy collateral damage to
the economy.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant litera-
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ture on contagion. Section 3 presents the empirical model and our methodol-
ogy. Here we discuss the data set, as well as the econometric issues involved
in the approach. In Section 4 we present the results and discuss their inter-
pretation. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Review of the literature
The word contagion appears in the recent economic debate in the late nineties
in the wake of the Mexican and Asian crises. While in the medical science
contagion indicates the spread of a disease from one individual to another,
in economics contagion has a narrower meaning. Diﬀerent economies are tied
by ﬁnancial and trade linkages, which are reﬀered to as spillovers or channels
of interdependence; contagion refers to the fact that in particular occasions,
typically during economic crises, the transmission of economic shocks rises
in intensity over and above what is justiﬁed by normal interdependence. In
the simplest speciﬁcation, consider two asset prices ys in two countries s =i,
j, that are linked by a relationship of the form:
yi = βijyj + εi (1)
where the interdependence parameter βij describes the eﬀect of a change in
country j's asset price on country i's price. In this framework contagion occurs
if, during a crisis in country j, a structural break occurs in the βi parameter,
which typically rises in absolute value, so that the movement in asset prices in
country j is transimitted to country i with an unusual strenght.
Eichengreen Rose Wyplosz (1996) deﬁne contagion as the probability that
a crisis in a country at a point in time is correlated with the occurrence of a
crisis in other countries, after controlling for the eﬀects of political and eco-
nomic fundamentals. A common approach to testing for contagion is based
on the analysis of correlation coeﬃcients across asset returns. If the correla-
tion in returns between assets in two markets increases signiﬁcantly during a
crisis, this is interpreted as evidence of contagion. In possibly the ﬁrst major
contribution to the literature, King and Wadhwani (1990) ﬁnd that the corre-
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lation between the U.S, U.K. and Japan increased signiﬁcantly after the U.S
stock market crash ok 1987, see also Lee and Kim (1993), Calvo and Reinhart
(1995), Baig and Goldfajn (1999) for an application to Asian and Latin Amer-
ican emerging markets. This approach was criticized by Forbes and Rigobon
(1999, 2002), who showed that the rise in asset price volatility during crises
may per se raise the cross-country correlation without determining a change in
the interdependence parameters βi of the underlying model (1), see also Boyer,
Gibson, and Loretan (1999), as well as Loretan and English (2000). A possible
solution consists in adjusting the correlation coeﬃcient for the change in the
volatility of returns in the country where the crisis originates, see for example
Ronn (1995), Boyer et al. (1999), Loretan and English (2000), Forbes and
Rigobon (1999, 2002). The latter authors look at the 1997 East Asian crisis,
the 1994 Mexican peso crisis and the 1987 stock market crash in the US. The
conventional tests ﬁnd evidence of contagion in 50 per cent of the cases during
the Asian and US episodes, and in about 20 percent of the cases during the
Mexican collapse. Conversely, the tests based on the adjusted correlations ﬁnd
almost no evidence.
This result was in turn criticized for example by Corsetti, Pericoli, Sbracia
(2005), as it relied on two strong assumptions: i) that contagion spreads from
one country to another with the source country being exogenous; ii) that there
are no omitted variables which aﬀect both stock markets resulting in spurious
correlation. These assumptions bias the test towards rejection of the contagiom
hypothesis. For instance, Corsetti et al.consider a factor model where returns
in the two countries depend on a common factor. They show that the Forbes
and Rigobon 's test is biased towards accepting the null hypothesis of no
contagion. Applying their modiﬁed test to Hong Kong, Singapore and the
Philippines stock markets, they ﬁnd evidence of contagion, when Forbes and
Rigobon test would not, see also Pericoli and Sbracia (2003), Dungey and
Martin (2001), Dungey et al. (2005) and Bekaert et al. (2005).
In particular, Bekaert et Ng. (2005) and Bekaert et al. (2011) propose a
CAPM approach with time varying factor loadings, which depend on a large set
of control variables. Here contagion manifests itself in an increased sensitivity
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of asset prices to fundamentals at times of crisis. Longstaﬀ and Ang (2011)
study the exposure of sovereigns to systemic shocks, in the US and EU. They
ﬁnd that sovereign risk is strongly and negatively correlated with stock market
indexes. Bekaert et al. (2011) analize contagion across diﬀerent portfolios of
equity markets of 55 countries during the 2007-09 ﬁnancial crisis, using a three
factor model with a global (US) factor, a ﬁnancial factor and a domestic factor.
Overall, they ﬁnd only small evidence of systematic contagion from US markets
and from the global ﬁnancial sector to equity markets, but strong evidence of
domestic contagion between assets of diﬀerent sectors in the same country.
This latter methodological approach is particularly suitable for our purposes.
Finally, there is a large literature that looks at contagion trough interest
rates. For example, Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) point out that the
introduction of a single currency has eliminated real exchange rate risks but,
because of the loss of monetary independence, may have potentially increased
the risk of default. Many contributions ﬁnd a common international factor
driving interest spreads in the EMU. Dungey et al. (2000) interpret this com-
mon factor as a measure of appetite for risk, see also Codogno et al. (2003),
Favero, Pagano and Von Thadden (2005). Eichengreen and Mody (2000) ﬁnd
evidence of a common international trend for sovereign bond spreads in emerg-
ing markets, with US bond yields being the main driver. Subsequent studies
have analyzed the determinants of government bond yield spreads in the euro
area since 2007. Barrios et al. (2009), using weekly data CDS spreads, ﬁnd
that the impact of domestic factors on bond yield spreads increase signicantly
during the crisis, see also Sgherri et Zoli (2009). Recently, Giordano et al
(2012) ﬁnd support for the wake up call hypothesis looking at bond spreads
in the Eurozone.
3 Empirical framework
3.1 The model
Our idea is to model interdependence across European sovereign CDS spreads
through a simple three factor model. The theoretical grounding of the model
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is the arbitrage pricing theory in ﬁnance. Asset returns are determined by
a set of common factors, representing non-diversiﬁable risk, and a set of id-
iosyncratic factors representing diversiﬁable risk (Sharpe 1964, Solnik 1974, for
an appication to the contagion literature see also Dungey and Martin (2001),
Corsetti et al. (2001) and Bekaert et al. (2005, 2011)). The model builds on
Bekaert et al. (2011) in the use of time varying parameters and in the use
of market indexes as a proxy for unobserved sources of commonalities across
sovereigns. The beta parameters are our measure of the relative responsive-
ness of a sovereign spread in country i to market movements in country j. The
beta embeds the systematic risk of the CDS relative to a reference market and,
in parallel with the case of stocks, it can be thought of as a measure of the risk
carried by a single entity on a well diversiﬁed portfolio of CDS. Note however
that these parameters need to be interpreted with caution, since an increase
in βij can result either from an increase in the correlation between the asset
prices in country i and j , %ij , or/and from the rise in the relative volatility
of country i's spread relative to j, βij = ρijσi/σj.
Relatively to Bekaert et al. (2011) our model diﬀers along several dimen-
sions. First, we apply the analysis to CDS sovereign spreads, rather than to
equity markets. Second, given that the number of sovereigns is much smaller
than the number of sectors in their analysis, we enlarge the sample space by
exploiting the time dimension, rather than sectional dimension. While Bekaert
et al. (2011) estimate the model's parameter before and after the crisis, and
then relate the observed diﬀerence to a set of instruments, we develop a dif-
ferent procedure. For all the countries in our sample we estimate the model
on a moving window of data. This enables us to recover a long sequence of
parameter estimates over time, which we then exploit for testing the determi-
nants of contagion eﬀects. Third, we introduce a number of reﬁnements in
the construction of market indexes by using principal component analysis in
order to have a better proxies for common risk factors. The model looks as
follows:
Φ(L)4sit = αit + β ′it4Ft + εit (2)
where 4sit is the daily change in the CDS spread of country i as of time
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t . We assume an autoregressive process so that Φ(L) is a polynomial in
the lag operator L, in order to capture potential autocorrelation in spread
changes. F t is a vector of three diﬀerent factors, our interdependence channels,
measuring Global, European and Financial risks; αit is the drift of the CDS
spread daily change of country i at time t, εit is the residual which we assume
to be uncorrelated among countries. We model the parameters of each i-th
country as follows:
αi,t = α0 + α
′
1Zi,t−k + ηi,tCRt + δEUZ + ui,t (3)
βi,t = β0 + β
′
1Zi,t−k + γi,tCRt + φEUZ + vi,t (4)
ηi,t = η0 + η
′
1Zi,t−k + η2EUZ (5)
γi,t = γ0 + γ
′
1Zi,t−k + γ2EUZ (6)
where Zi,t−k is a vector of exogenous lagged control variables, primarly
macroeconomic fundamentals at country level, which are expected to explain
cross country diﬀerences in the time varying coeﬃcients, CRt is a dummy
variable that takes value 1 during the period of the Greek sovereign debt crisis
and 0 otherwise. Ft ≡
[
FGt , F
E
t , F
F
t
]
denotes the vector containing the change
in a global risk factor, FG, the change in a European risk factor, FE and the
change in a ﬁnancial risk factor, F F (to be discussed below in more detail),
and EUZ is a dummy variable that equals one for countries in the Eurozone
and zero for countries outside.
Equation (2) is the standard Arbitrage Pricing Theory. Equation (3) cap-
tures the idea that the idyosyncratic component of the drift of a country's
sovereign spread, αit, may vary through time and may depend on the evolu-
tion of a country's macro fundamentals, on whether it's crisis time (contagion
eﬀects), on whether the country belongs to the Eurozone. Similarly, equation
(4) assumes that the sensitivity parameters β to the diﬀerent external factors
may change over time depending on fundamentals, on the crisis/non crisis pe-
riods and on the Eurozone membership . Equations (5) and (6) introduce a
new channel through which fundamentals and Euro membership may aﬀect
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spreads: the state of the economy Z , and the Euro membership, may inﬂu-
ence the sensitivity of spreads to the crisis. This may occur because (weak)
fundamentals and EUZ membership may aﬀect the crisis' impact on the the
idiosyncratic risk drift (η ), or/and because they may change the contagion
vulnerability via the γ′s. The idea is that during a crisis, investor may reassess
the importance of market fundamentals, and revise the country's perceived
idiosyncratic risk and its vulnerability to external contagion. In principle,
membership of the Euro area may either reduce or raise these risks and vul-
nerabilities before or during a crisis, depending on the sign of the coeﬃcient
(δ, φ and η, γ)
In equation (2) the external factors Ft ≡
[
FGt , F
E
t , F
F
t
]
are measured as
follows: FG, the change the global risk factor, is deﬁned by an index of Global
(non-European) sovereigns CDS spreads; the European risk factor,FE is mea-
sured by the change of an index of Western European sovereigns CDS spreads;
the Financial risk factor, F F is an index of CDS on private European Fi-
nancial Institution. The composition of the indexes reﬂect respectively the
Markit iTraxx SovX Global Liquid Investment Grade Index (comprising the
most liquid high grade sovereign entities around the globe), the Markit iTraxx
SovX Western Europe Index (comprising 11 members of the Eurozone plus
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom) and the Markit iTraxx Eu-
ropean Senior Financials Index (comprising 25 major ﬁnancial institutions in
Europe), see the Appendix for a list of sovereigns and ﬁnancial institutions
appearing in each index.
The evolution of these three Indexes across our sample period is shown
in Figure 1. Besides the extremely high correlation among the three indexes,
we observe an almost perfect comovement between the European Sovereigns
and the European ﬁnancial Indexes from 2010 to 2012. We do not to employ
these indexes themselves, but we construct our own country speciﬁc indicators,
for several reasons. First, we want to avoid the endogeneity and spurious
correlation problems that arise when a European country's spread appears
both as the dependent variable and in the European sovereign index. Hence
we compute a country speciﬁc indicator by excluding each country i from the
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Figure 1: Plot of ITraxx Global Sov Index (excluding Western Europe), ITraxx European
Sovereign Index (excluding Greece), Itraxx European Financial Index
index used in the i-th regression. Similarly, we want to exclude the Western
European countries from the Markit iTraxx SovX Global Liquid Investment
Grade Index, in order to avoid counting the same countries in two diﬀerent
variables.
Rather than using the original MArkit indexes, we construct our risk
measures calculating the ﬁrst principal components of the sovereign CDS in-
cluded in the index. This procedure is justiﬁed by the empirical evidence
(see Longstaﬀ et al. 2011) that suggests that the ﬁrst principal component
of sovereign CDS is actually an almost equally weighted index of the single
sovereigns' CDSs. Moreover, our indexes are appealing because they weight
individual components in a way that maximizes the variance over all linear
combinations of the underlying components, the CDS spreads. Thus they cap-
ture more eﬀectively the common component of the risk indicators. The
Principal component computations are performed recursively on each rolling
windows for which regressions are estimated, and the resulting factor loadings,
the weights of the indexes, are normalized to sum up to unity in each iteration.
Another problem of the market indexes is that they are highly correlated
among themselves, as shown in the previous ﬁgure and suﬀer from feedback
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problems. Changes in investors' risk aversion stemming from, say, the US, are
likely to aﬀect European sovereigns as well as the European Financial sector,
and similarly the consequences of the European debt crisis are likely to feed
back into to global risks. This is even more true for the relation between the
European Financial sector and European sovereigns. Acharya et. al (2011), for
example, suggest that the ﬁnancial sector bailouts have been an integral factor
in igniting the rise of sovereign credit risk. A bail-out guarantees is typically
accompanied by a shift of the credit risk from the banks to the sovereigns. In
turn, the deterioration of sovereign creditworthiness feeds back to the ﬁnancial
sector itself: on the one hand, the fall in the market price of sovereign bonds
deteriorates bank' asset side (collateral damage ) which hold larg chunks of
the government debt; on the other, it reduces the value of the (implicit) public
bail-out guarantee.
In order to clean our measures of risk factors from these endogeneity prob-
lems, following Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2009), we orthogonalise the three
factors. First, we extract the European sovereign component by regressing our
European sovereign index on the Global sovereigns index, and by using the
residual as our European Component: by construction, the calculated Euro-
pean sovereign risk factor does not reﬂect the movement of the sovereigns risks
in the rest of the world. Similarly, we regress the European Financial index on
both the Global and the European Sovereign component derived before. The
residual of this regression is used as a Financial factor in the model. It captures
those movements in the credit risk of the main European ﬁnancial institutions
which are not explained by or embedded in the movements of the Global or
European sovereigns indexes. In this procedure we have chosen a particular
ordering in the transmission of risks: from Global to European Sovereign
to European Financial. In order to check the robustness of our results, we
have also tried a diﬀerent ordering between these factors: Global, European
Financial, European Sovereign. The results do not change any meaningfully
(and are available upon request).
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3.2 The Data
Our preference for using CDS spreads as indicators of sovereign risk is well
explained by Longstaﬀ et Ang (2011), who argue that sovereign CDS data
have the advantage, relative to sovereign bond yields, of being more liquid and
allowing more accurate estimates of credit risks. Morover, because it might
be easier to enter into a CDS contract than to buy/sell a certain bond, CDS
prices have a tendency to incorporate information more quickly than prices in
the bond markets (see Bomﬁm (2005).The sample period is 1 January 2006 to
29 march 2012. It contains 1630 daily observations on 15 European sovereign
CDS spreads. Among these sovereigns, 11 belong to the Euro zone (Germany,
France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Netherland, Austria,
Finland) and 4 do not (Sweden, Norway, UK and Northern Ireland, Denmark).
By considering major economies both inside and outside the monetary union
we can check whether contagion, if present, is mainly due to being a member
of a single currency union or to spill-overs due to regional proximity. As a
start date for the Greek (or European) sovereign debt crisis we take November
2009, when a new government lead by George Papandreu revised the 2009
Greek deﬁcit from a previously estimated 5% to an alarming 12.7% of GDP.
Besides, we performed a robustness analysis with the alternative starting-date
of April 2010, when Standard & Poor's slashed Greece's sovereign rating to
junk status. Data on CDS have been collected from Datastream by Thomson
Reuters.
4 The Analytical Results
4.1 Estimation of the time-varying coeﬃcients
The ﬁrst step of the analysis consists in estimating the idiosyncratic (alpha)
and contagion (beta) parameters of each country's spread, and in tracking their
evolution overtime. To this end we estimate equation (2) recursively, country
by country, by means of rolling regressions. In particular, we divide the sam-
ple into rolling windows, each consisting of 200 daily observations. We chose
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this window size in order to have enough observations in each sub-sample,
while keeping a relatively large number of sample estimates. We tried with
smaller/larger wsizes (150/300 observations) with similar results. Separatedly
within each window, we apply the principal component analysis and the or-
thogonalization procedure outlined before, and construct the factors F. We
then estimate equation (2) recursively by OLS, using ﬁve lags of the depen-
dent variable to capture possible autocorrelation inside each subsample, for a
total of 1430 regressions and point estimates. We retrieve the coeﬃcients (al-
pha and betas) and we assigne them to the last observation of each subsample.
For instance, if a window covers the period from 01/02/2006 to 01/10/2006,
our estimates are labelled with the date 01/10/2006. In order to reduce noise,
we transform the daily time series of parameter estimate into weekly series, by
averaging coeﬃcients across each week.
There are four parameters of interest. The ﬁrst, αit, is a country speciﬁc
component (constant within each window) which is similar to a Jensen's alpha
in a standard CAPM model. It captures the systematic part in the change in
the sovereign spreads which is not explained by the interdependence with the
market. As such, the αit may capture idiosyncratic factors such as appetite for
risks eﬀects, that are unrelated to the the other market risk indexes. Positive
and signiﬁcant changes in the alphas may occur during the crisis (parameters η
in equation 3), and may reﬂect wake up calls (parameters η1). In particular,
should a plurality of countries displays large and contemporaneous increases
in their αit , this would be a strong indicator of a change in risk aversion (a
sort of epidemic), possibly due to herding behaviour, or to the coordination
of investors on a particular equilibrium.
The other three parameters of interest are the betas, βGit , β
E
it ,β
E
it , which
measure the association between the country's sovereign spread change and,
respectively, the Global, European, and Financial risk factors. By looking at
their evolution over time we can see how the relative importance of the diﬀerent
channels of interdependence changes since the US ﬁnancial crisis into the Greek
debt crisis. Contagion in this context means that the betas signiﬁcantly
rise during a crisis (parameter γi in equation 4). Such contagion may be
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induced either by an unconditional increase(γ0) or by an increase due to market
fundamentals Zi,t−k
(
γ
′
1
)
.
4.2 Analyzing the sources of time and cross-country vari-
ation in coeﬃcients
The second step of our analysis consists in uncovering the determinants of
time variation and cross-country diﬀerence in the alphas and in the betas and
test for contagion. In order to perform the analysis, we stack the weekly time
series of estimated parameters for each country in a single multi-country panel
dataset which also contains the respective economic (lagged) variables Zi,t−k.
The latter comprise standard macroeconomic, ﬁnancial variables and risk aver-
sion indicators. In order to prevent the endogeneity problem that arises when
stochastic shocks aﬀect both the dependent (our estimated coeﬃcient) and the
explanatory variables (the fundamentals), we lag the latter by a quarter. We
also need to address the issue of the diﬀerent frequency of the observations.
While CDS spreads are observable on a daily basis, most macroeconomic vari-
ables are available only on a monthly, quarterly or annual basis. Moreover, for
several of these variables, the most recent data for 2012 are unavailable. In or-
der to address the ﬁrst problem we use linear interpolation to construct weekly
observations from monthly, quarterly and annual observations, which means
that we assume that macroeconomic variables evolve smoothly over time. For
the second problem we replace the missing Eurostat data for 2012 with the
AMECO macroeconomic forecasts.
We include a wide range of country-speciﬁc macroeconomic indicators: the
public debt/GDP ratio, the budget deﬁcit/GDP ratio, the current account
balance as percentage of GDP, the percentage change in industrial produc-
tion. Also, we employ trade openess, exports plus imports scaled by GDP, as
the trade channel has often been associated with international spillovers (see
Eichengreen et al. (1996), Forbes (2001), Kamisky and Reinhart (2000)). In
particular, the large trade integration within the European Union may play
a role in the transmission of shocks. We proxy international risk aversion
through the VIX Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility
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Index) which measures the market's expectation of the stock market volatility
over the next 30 days. We use the TED spread (the diﬀerence between the
three-month LIBOR and the three-month T-bill interest rate) as indicator of
liquidity in the inter-bank market and possibly of credit risk of the banking
sector. Finally, we convert Moodys' rating on a 0-23 scale, and we take the
unexplaind residual of a regression of these notches on the previously listed
economic variables, so as to construct a measure of the new information
content of the ratings.
Equations (5) and (6) allow us to test for the the wake up call hypoth-
esis discussed above, by means of a t-test on the γ and η coeﬃcients. Also
note that under the maintained hypotheses of our model, we can interpret
the share of the variance of the alpha and beta regressions that can be ex-
plained by our economic variables as a measure of the empirical support to
the fundamentalist view of contagion (vulnerability depends on fundamen-
tals) while the unexplained variance can either be attributed to the multiple
equilibria/credibility view or to a misspeciﬁcation of the model.
We estimate the equations (3) to (6) by means of pooled OLS. Because we
have several macroeconomic variables which are likely to be highly correlated,
collinearity may be a problem, generating many insigniﬁcant regressors. We
use the general to speciﬁc approach of David Hendry (Hendry and Krolzig
2004): we start by estimating the model with all the variables, and then we
eliminate those which are not signiﬁcant at 15% level. This high threshold is
needed in order not to exclude potentially important regressors. We proceed
step by step by excluding individual variables, and simultaneously testing, at
each step, whether an already excluded variable should be included again, until
we arrive at a ﬁnal encompassing model speciﬁcation. A particular variable is
kept in the speciﬁcation if either its coeﬃcient β1 or its contagion parameter
γ1 are statistically signiﬁcant.
4.3 Step One: Rolling Regressions
Next we describe the behaviour across time of the estimated coeﬃcients of
equation (2). The ﬁrst parameter, see Figure 2-3, is αit. The alpha traces the
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systematic movement in idiosyncratic risk, e.g. the drift in the country's
CDS spread daily change. This is a domestic component, since, by construc-
tion, is unrelated to external (global, european, ﬁnancial) factors included in
the model. When this parameter spikes simultaneously for many countries, we
have an indication the market is hit by some sort of panic, possibly resulting
from herd behavior, a rise in risk aversion, a coordinated shift in expectations,
aﬀecting many countries at once. In Figures 2-3 we show for each country the
estimates obtained. For clarity of presentation we set to zero the estimates
which are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at a 5% conﬁdence level (the values
set to zero are indeed very small, so that we do not set to zero large estimates
that also have large dtandard deviations). The eﬀects of the US subprime cri-
sis (September 2008 and March 2009) and the Greek Crisis (around November
2009) are evident in the data: the jumps in the alpha coeﬃcients are clustered
around these episodes (notice that the scale for Greece in the graph is diﬀerent,
for obvious reasons). There are three interesting features in the graphs. First,
countries diﬀer substantially as to the impact of the crises, that is, the size
of the individual jumps of the alphas. Countries naturally divide themselves
into three sizes: Small (Finland, Germany and Norway), Medium (Sweden,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the UK, and Austria on the high
side) and Large (the periphery: Spain, Italy, Ireland Portugal, Greece). Sec-
ond, while the US subprime earthquake aﬀected all Europeans, albeit with
diﬀerent magnitudes (Ireland, followed by Austria and the UK being the most
aﬀected), the Greek crisis is largely a matter for the Eurozone. Norway, Swe-
den, the UK and Denmark, which do not belong to the Euro, were hardly
aﬀected. Finally, diﬀerences inside the Eurozone are at least as remarkable as
those between member and non members: only France, Belgium, Italy, Spain,
Ireland and Portugal show large and recurrent spikes in idiosyncratic risk. It
is worth noticing that Ireland, which required a formal bailout on november
2010, was not really aﬀected by the Greek crisis before August 2010. This
is consistent with the view that Irish problems are mainly the consequence
of the bailout of the banking sector in the wake of the US Financial crisis,
although the Greek crisis may well have aggravated the risks. The evidence is
18
diﬀerent for Portugal, that experienced a long period of increasing spread drift
before its ﬁnal request of help on April 2011. Interestingly, Italy did not expe-
rience substantial loss of conﬁdence until September 2011, when Italian bonds
were under attack forcing the resignation of Silvio Berlusconi's government in
November. Interestingly, spikes in the Italian graph correspond, even if in a
more limited fashion, to spikes in the graph of France, Spain, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Denmark, Austria. This suggests that problems in Italy might
potentially cause contagion eﬀects not limited to the perifery of the Monetary
Union.
The other parameters of interest are the beta coeﬃcients βit ≡
[
βGlobit , β
Eur
it , β
Fin
it
]
.
These capture the dependence of each sovereign CDS on the three market in-
dexes considered, βGlob the global risk component, βEur the European sovereign
speciﬁc component (orthogonal to the previous index), and βFin the European
Financials CDS Index (again othogonal to the previous two). These betas
are modelled to depend on economic fundamentals, on our measure of risk
aversion, the VIX, and on the crisis dummy. Before getting into the formal
econometric analysis, it is useful to plot the evolution of these channels of
interdependence in order to shed some light on the sources of contagion. The
estimates are reported in Figures 4-5. As before, the scale is diﬀerent for
Greece, and we only report coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0
at a 5% conﬁdence level.
There are a few interesting features. First, before the outset of the US
subprime crisis, around September 2008, there seems to be no signiﬁcant in-
terdependence in sovereign risks. European sovereigns were perceived as low-
risk entities and CDS spreads were extremely stable. Starting from September
2008, however, sovereign credit risks began to be priced for almost all of the
countries in the sample. We observe a sharp and generalized increase in the
comovement of sovereign spreads in Europe, which translates in a remarkable
increase in the sensitivity parameterβEur (the blue line). These parameters
range between 0.5 and 2 , with values which are higher for Ireland and Aus-
tria, Italy, Spain and Portugal, reach the value 1 for UK, Sweden, Denmark,
the Netherlands, and are around 0.5 for most other countries. Thus, initially
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Figure 2: Time-varying alpha coeﬃcients (αit) estimated by means of rolling regressions. Only coeﬃ-
cients which signiﬁcantly diﬀer from 0 at 5% conﬁdence level are reported.
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Figure 3: Time-varying alpha coeﬃcients (αit) estimated by means of rolling regressions. Only coeﬃ-
cients which are signiﬁcantly diﬀer from 0 at 5% conﬁdence level are reported.
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it seems that European countries, inside and outside the Euro, were similarly
aﬀected by European sovereign risk. Things change dramatically at the onset
of the Greek crisis. From November 2009 the diﬀerences among European
countries rise sharply. Southern European and Irish CDS become much more
sensitive to movements in the European sovereign Index. Conversely, the βEur
coeﬃcient falls below 0.5 in core European countries: even countries such as
Austria and The Netherlands, that had experienced hightened sensitivity dur-
ing the US ﬁnancial crisis, now display a sharp decline in their European beta.
Conversely, among peripheral countries, Italy, Spain and Ireland show high
persistence in their spread sensitivity, while Portugal and Greece experience a
sharp further increase.
The red line corresponds to the behaviour of the βGlob parameer, which
measures the sensitivity of the country's spread change to global sovereign risk.
Initially this parameter is very small and insigniﬁcant for almost all countries,
at least until July 2009 when it starts rising. Eventually, βGlob overtakes the
βEur around mid 2010, and keeps moving up, although at diﬀerent speeds,
in France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Austria and Germany, while
stabilizing towards the end of the period for the other countries. The increase
is small for Germany, Finland, Netherland; medium for France, Austria and
Belgium; and large for Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Greece. Most notably,
around March 2010 we observe a simultaneous large break in the parameter
for Italy, Spain and Portugal: on the wake of a possible downgrade of Greece
to junk status, these countries were suddenly perceived more vulnerable to
the global economic outlook and started to amplify movements of the global
index. These patterns hold irrespectively of the proxy for global risk: if we
replace Global Sovereign Index with the S&P500 we get similar results.
Finally, the green line in the ﬁgures shows the European Financial risk
component, βFin. Until about August 2010, this is almost alwas insigniﬁcant
in determining sovereign CDS variations. But as we proceed in time we observe
a general increase in the sensitivity to the ﬁnancial risk index, which parrallels
the rise in global risks and the decline in the European risks, as if the sensitivity
sovereign crisis originating in Greece had been transferred, on the one hand, to
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Figure 4: Time-varying beta coeﬃcients (βGlob- red line, βEur- blue line, βFin - green line) estimated
by means of rolling regressions. Only coeﬃcients which signiﬁcantly diﬀer from 0 at 5% conﬁdence level are
reported.
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Figure 5: Time-varying beta coeﬃcients (βGlob - red line, βEur - blue line, βFin - green line) estimated
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the vulnerability to the Global sovereign risk component, and. on the other,
to the sensitivity to the European banks risks. This is most noticeble in Italy
and Spain, two countries that between August and November, experienced
severe attacks on the bond markets, leading to ECB massive interventions.
In Germany and Northern European countries, the interdependence with the
ﬁnancial factor became signiﬁcant only later, in July 2011, at the time when a
private sector involvement (PSI) agreement was included in the second bail-out
package for Greece.
4.4 StepTwo: Explaining Contagion
In order to understand the reasons behind the diﬀerent vulnerabilities to con-
tagion, the betas, and to panic, the alphas, we use panel estimation. We
regress our countries' time varying parameters on the respective (lagged) eco-
nomic fundamentals (trade openness, the public debt/GDP ratio, the budget
deﬁcit/GDP ratio, the current account balance as percentage of GDP, the
rate of unemployment, the monthly change in industrial production), on the
sovereigns' credit rating innovations, on an index of market volatility (the
VIX), on a liquidity measure of the inter-bank market (the TED spread), a
crisis dummy (which takes the value of one from November 2009, when the
estimate for the Greek 2009 budget deﬁcit was raised from 5 to 12.7%) and
on a Euro Zone dummy. We have excluded Greece from our sample, because
this country is likely to be the source of systemic risk, so that its parameter
estimates may aﬀected by strong endogeneity problems. In fact, Greek alphas
and betas take extreme values and should be considered as outliers which,
if included, would probably bias our estimates. We report the results of the
estimation in Tables 1-4.
Alpha coeﬃcients. Table 1 presents the results for the idyiosyncratic risk
component. The ﬁrst column (interdep α′1, see equation 3) shows the direct
eﬀect of economic fundamentals on the idiosyncratic drift of the spread. The
fourth column (η′1 crisis, see equation 5) reports the indirect additional eﬀect
of the economic fundamental during a crisis. Thus, for example in the ﬁrst
column, third row, we read that a one percent increase in the rate of growth
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of industrial production signiﬁcantly reduces the idiosyncratic component of
the spread change by 0.4%. The η′1 coeﬃcient in the fourth column tell us
that during the crisis this eﬀect is magniﬁed by an extra -1.1% so that the
total eﬀect in a crisis sums up to a reduction in the drift of 1.5%. The sign of
direct eﬀects of the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients conform to our a priori : the rate
of growth in industrial production enters with a negative sign, so that a larger
growth rate is associated to a lower idiosyncratic vulnerability; the ratio of the
budget deﬁcit to GDP and the volatility index enter with positive sign, so they
are both associated with higher sovereign risk drift. These are the only vari-
able that show signiﬁcant direct eﬀects on the sovereign risk drift: the other
variables, the current account balance, the public debt ratio, the unemploy-
ment rate and trade openness, are not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Things
change quite dramatically during the crisis (see the η′1 coeﬃcients in the third
column). First, we see that during a crisis the constant term of the equation
turns positive and signiﬁcant. More interestingly, countries belonging to the
EUZ (see the dummy coeﬃcient) have an additional vulnerability to idiosyn-
cratic risks so that Euro-membership adds an extra 0,34% to the sovereign
spread change relative to non EUZ members. Note that EUZ dummy was not
statistically diﬀerent from zero outside the crisis. Also, we see that the crisis
ampliﬁes the eﬀect of growth on the idiosyncratic risk component. Finally, ob-
serve that the ratio of debt to GDP, the rate of unemployment, and Moody's
rating innovations, which had no signiﬁcant direct eﬀect in normal times, be-
come signiﬁcantly and positively associated to a country's idiosyncratic risk in
the crisis. This suggests that while markets tend to ignore solvency measures,
credit agencies' ratings and labor market developments in normal times, under
period of stress these variable convey useful information on sovereign default
risks. The same is true for trade opennes, possibly reﬂecting the role of cur-
rent account imbalances in countries such as Spain and Ireland. The conclusion
here is that ﬁnancial markets which benignly neglected fundamentals, got a
sudden wake up call with the crisis. It is important to point out that the
corrected R2 coeﬃcient shows that our macro-economic fundamentals can ac-
count for about 54% of the cross-country diﬀerences in idiosyncratic sovereign
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Pooled OLS, using 2665 observations
13 Units cross section
Dependent variable: αt
Robust Standard errors (HAC)
interd. (α) Std. Error p-value crisis (η) Std. Error p-value
const −0,166265 0,366462 0,6501 −0,229747 0,113195 0,0425 **
EZ −0,0437684 0,0586939 0,4559 0,346037 0,160526 0,0312 **
Industrial Prod. −0,00456631 0,00251173 0,0692 * −0,0111891 0,00447375 0,0124 **
Public Debt −0,00238887 0,00254621 0,3482 0,00601242 0,00263260 0,0225 **
Public Deﬁcit 0,0256049 0,0136868 0,0615 * −0,000389891 0,000531999 0,4637
Current Account −0,00953192 0,00646830 0,1407 0,00270353 0,00196413 0,1688
Unemployment −0,00532230 0,0228851 0,8161 0,0233754 0,0103858 0,0245 **
Trade Open 0,00151996 0,00127177 0,2321 −0,00344331 0,000915407 0,0002 ***
Rating 0,0495670 0,0635503 0,4355 −0,276175 0,0935336 0,0032 ***
VIX 0,00797780 0,00105036 0,0000 *** −0,00703624 0,00424160 0,0973 *
TED 0,0190308 0,0131000 0,1464 −0,112881 0,249257 0,6507
Average dependent variable 0,288530 SQM dependent var. 0,493629
Squared sum of residuals 295,0123 S.E. of the regression 0,334096
R2 0,545531 R2 corrected 0,541920
F (21, 2643) 151,0752 P-value(F ) 0,000000
Log-likelihood −848,7158 Akaike Criterion 1741,432
Schwarz Criterion 1870,967 HannanQuinn 1788,306
Table 1: The table shows the estimates of the coeﬃcients of the following regression
αi,t = α0 + α
′
1Zi,t−k + ηi,tCRt + δEUZ + ui,ti,t,
ηi,t = η0 + η
′
1Zi,t−k + η2EUZ
where in the constant parameter we have introduced an Euro-Zone dummy (EZ) in order to control for ﬁxed
eﬀects at the Euro-Zone level. We reportnegative for EZ the β1and γ1 coeﬃcients, which are the
coeﬃcients on the Zi,t−k instruments that survive an encompassing approach of variable selection where
each variable is kept in the regression if either the interdependence coeﬃcient β or the crisis parameter γ
of a particular variable is statistically signiﬁcant. ***, **, and *, indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%,
5% and 10% respectively.
risk changes.
Beta Global Sovereigns. We saw that the parameter βGlob , which rep-
resents a country's vulnerability to global sovereign risks, increases signiﬁ-
cantly during the Greek crisis, albeit with diﬀerent intensity, for almost all of
the countries of the Eurozone, and in particular in the perifery (Spain, Italy,
Portugal, Ireland). It is therefore interesting to understand which macroeco-
nomic imbalances are reponsible for this. In the model, it turns out that four
variables have a signiﬁcant direct eﬀects before the outset of the Greek debt
crisis (see the ﬁrst column of Table 2 which reports the β′1 parameters in equa-
27
tion 4): the public debt/GDP ratio (positive sign), the current account balance
over GDP (negative sign), trade openess (positive sign), the EZ membership
(negative sign). Interestingly, in normal times the global sensitivity is zero
on average (see the constant term) but it is negative for EUZ members: the
common currency shelters its members from global contagion relative to non
members. However, during the crisis the EUZ dummy variable turns positive
(and signiﬁcant), making the total eﬀect positive (-0.216859 + 0.585314). Euro
membership makes countries more exposed to global contagion. As with the
α coeﬃcients, the fourth column of Table 2 shows that the solvency indicator
(public debt GDP ratio) becomes signiﬁcantly more important in explaining
sensitivity to global contagion; the real macro fundamentals such as the rate
of unemployment, the growth of industrial production, as well as the credit
ratings and the VIX volatility index, which were not relevant in normal times,
become statistically signiﬁcant with the expected sign during the crisis. Our
variables toghether explain around 75% of the cross-country variation in the
exposure to global sovereign risk.
Beta European Sovereigns. In Figure 4 we saw that the European contagion
parameters βEur varied in a very narrow range before the crisis, but became
much more diverse in the crisis, mainly reﬂecting the dichotomy between the
Euro-Zone core and perifery. Our empirical ﬁndings in this section sug-
gest that these developments largely reﬂect an increased market sensitivity
to macroeconomic fundamentals. Before the Greek crisis (see the second col-
umn of Table 3), the only economic variables which signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
European contagion parameters are the public debt/GDP ratio (with positive
sign), the growth of industrial production (negative sign) , trade openess (also
positive) and the volatility VIX index (positive). Interestingly, EUZ members
are less vulnerable to European Sovereigns shocks than non EUZ countries.
The TED spread is strogly signiﬁcant but has the wrong (i.e negative) sign.
The landscape change dramatically during the crisis (see the fourth column).
Euro members become more vulnerable to European Sovereign contagion; the
eﬀect of the debt ratio and of the growth rate becomes larger, while that of the
deﬁcit ratio smaller (its cumulative eﬀect slightly shrinks to 0.0065 - 0.0011);
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Pooled OLS, using 2665 observations
13 Units cross section
Dependent variable: βGlobt
Robust Standard errors (HAC)
interd. (β) Std. Error p-value crisis (γ) Std. Error p-value
const −0,727250 0,535742 0,1747 −0,479187 0,213632 0,0250 **
EZ −0,216859 0,07493189 0,0038 *** 0,585314 0,264396 0,0269 **
Industrial Prod. −0,0201525 0,00418808 0,2857 −0,0201525 0,00418808 0,000 ***
Public Debt 0,00518863 0,00255951 0,0427 ** 0,00925061 0,00348420 0,0080 ***
Public Deﬁcit −0,00370562 0,0151459 0,8067 0,00109129 0,000759264 0,1508
Current Account −0,0225463 0,0112377 0,0449 ** 0,00206343 0,00314830 0,5123
Unemployment 0,0351711 0,0332169 0,2898 0,0571232 0,0200701 0,0045 ***
Trade Open 0,00478264 0,002222321 0,0315 ** −0,0045512 0,00178745 0,0109 **
Rating −0,0666338 0,113844 0,5584 −0,205574 0,143024 0,1507 ***
VIX 0,000680143 0,00104845 0,5166 −0,0117996 0,00393176 0,0027 ***
TED −0,0194730 0,0155205 0,2097 0,123759 0,419739 0,7681
Average dependent variable 0,637784 SQM dependent var. 0,895060
Squared sum of residuals 541,7683 S.E. of the regression 0,746151
R2 0,746151 R2 corrected 0,744134
F (21, 2643) 369,9387 P-value(F ) 0,000000
Log-likelihood −1658,638 Akaike Criterion 3361,275
Schwarz Criterion 3490,810 HannanQuinn 3408,150
Table 2: The table shows the estimates of the coeﬃcients of the following regression
βGlobi,t = β0 + β
′
1Zi,t−k + γi,tCRt + φEUZ + vi,t,
γi,t = γ0 + γ
′
1Zi,t−k + γ2EUZ
where in the constant parameter we have introduced an Euro-Zone dummy (EZ) in order to control for
ﬁxed eﬀects at the Euro-Zone level. We report the β′1and γ
′
1 coeﬃcients, which are the coeﬃcients on the
Zi,t−k variables that survive an encompassing approach of variable selection where each variable is kept in
the regression if either the interdependence coeﬃcient β or the crisis parameter γ of a particular variable is
statistically signiﬁcant. ***, **, and *, indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Pooled OLS, using 2665 observations
13 Units cross section
Dependent variable: βEur
Robust Standard errors (HAC)
interd. (β) Std. Error p-value crisis (γ) Std. Error p-value
const −0,631694 0,401305 0,1156 −0,437127 0,136106 0,0013 ***
EZ −0,186255 0,0642000 0,0037 *** 0,459021 0,177297 0,0097 ***
Industrial Prod. −0,00306904 0,00431175 0,4767 * −0,0156621 0,00338892 0,0000 **
Public Debt 0,00502986 0,00215375 0,0196 ** 0,00723209 0,00229990 0,0017 ***
Public Deﬁcit 0,00646770 0,0111144 0,5607 * −0,00106919 0,000477892 0,0253 **
Current Account −0,00990861 0,00871749 0,2558 0,000272754 0,00222550 0,9025
Unemployment 0,0366050 0,0280228 0,1916 0,0431531 0,0157612 0,0062 ***
Trade 0,00394249 0,00168578 0,0227 ** −0,00234837 0,00136652 0,0858 *
Rating −0,00306904 0,105767 0,4771 −0,163742 0,114940 0,1544
VIX 0,00149434 0,000793704 0,0598 * −0,00960705 0,00226878 0,0000 ***
TED −0,0480093 0,0170268 0,0048 *** −0,204725 0,329137 0,5340
Average dependent variable 0,458345 SQM dependent var. 0,672040
Squared sum of residuals 233,2466 S.E. of the regression 0,297070
R2 0,806139 R2 corrected 0,804598
F (21, 2643) 523,3553 P-value(F ) 0,000000
Log-likelihood −535,6837 Akaike Criterion 1115,367
Schwarz Criterion 1244,903 HannanQuinn 1162,242
Table 3: The table shows the estimates of the coeﬃcients of the following regression
βEuri,t = β0 + β
′
1Zi,t−k + γi,tCRt + vi,t,
γi,t = γ0 + γ
′
1Zi,t−k
where in the constant parameter we have introduced an Euro-Zone dummy (EZ) in order to control for ﬁxed
eﬀects at the Euro-Zone level. We report the β1and γ1 coeﬃcients, which are the coeﬃcients on the Zi,t−k
instruments that survive an encompassing approach of variable selection where each variable is kept in the
regression if either the interdependence coeﬃcient β or the crisis parameter γ of a particular variable is
statistically signiﬁcant. ***, **, and *, indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
the unemployment rate, rate and the VIX index start to matter, while the
eﬀect of trade openness disappears. Thus, as before, the crisis exacerbates the
impact of the real economy on the contagion parameter. A particularly striking
feature is the lessened role of the budget deﬁcit, as opposed to that of the debt:
this suggest that the European strategy focusing on deﬁcit reduction, rather
than privatization and debt reduction, may backﬁre in terms of risk premia
if it is associated to a sharp reduction in the growth rate. Again, the ﬁt of
the regression is encouraging: an R2 close to 80%, implies that fundamentals
can account for most of the cross-country variation in exposure to European
contagion.
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Beta European Financial. As of July 2011, the sensitivity of sovereigns
spreads to the European ﬁnancial sector risk has also increased, albeit not
uniformly. For Ireland, Spain and Italy this is not surprising, as in the former
two countries the bail-out costs of the banking sector has wrecked government
ﬁnances, while Italian banks holds about one third of the government debt.
The econometric analysis delivers a few surprising results. From Table 4 we see
that, once again, the crisis turns EUZ memberships from a source of resilience
to a source of weakness to banking contagion. The role of the current account
is unaﬀected during the recent crisis, while the importance of trade openness
(0.0053 - 0.0048) and the volatility VIX index (0.00526065 - 0.00452) tend
to vanish at times of crisis. Interestingly, the public debt variable does not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the sensitivity of the sovereign spread change to European
ﬁnancial risk (at the 15% conﬁdence), neither before nor after the crisis and
this variable has been eliminated from our regression. Remember however
that by construction the Financial index is orthogonal to the EU sovereign
index, so that the the banking risk components that reﬂects sovereign risk, the
lower bail-out guarantee and risk of capital losses on government bonds, are
already netted out from the ﬁnancial index. Once again, unemployment and
growth are signiﬁcant only during the crisis. The coeﬃcient associated to the
TED spread and credit ratings seem counter intuitive.The TED indicator has
a negative sign, suggesting that when liquidity dries up in the credit market,
the sensivity of sovereigns to the ﬁnancial sector tends to fall. The second
parameter behaves diﬀerently outside and inside the crisis: in normal times
a sovereign upgrade by Moody's is associated to a larger ﬁnancial contagion,
which is counter intuitive; however, the rating coeﬃcient assumes the right
sign ( negative, 0.284096 - 0.355748) during the crisis, suggesting that in bad
times a downgrade raises the sovereign risk vulnerability to ﬁnancial risk.
We have performed a roubustness check in order to make sure that our
results do not depend on the orthogonalization ordering that we have assumed
(Global-European-Financial). We have tried the Global-Financial-European
ordering, by ﬁrst regressing our Financial index on the Global one and extract-
ing the ﬁnancial innovation, and then by regressing the European sovereign
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Pooled OLS, using 2665 observations
13 Units cross section
Dependent variable: βFin
Robust Standard errors (HAC)
interd. (β) Std. Error p-value crisis (γ) Std. Error p-value
const 0,147771 0,376528 0,6948 −0,0599768 0,234504 0,7982
EZ −0,420462 0,102473 0,0000 *** 0,891090 0,236498 0,0002 ***
Industrial Prod. −0,00350558 0,00804364 0,6630 −0,0169305 0,00773520 0,0287 **
Public Deﬁcit 0,0220864 0,0157803 0,1617 −0,00140381 0,000869854 0,1067
Current Acc. −0,0316340 0,00933279 0,0007 *** 0,00197756 0,00315168 0,5304
Unemployment 0,0263014 0,0306666 0,3912 0,0388029 0,0184463 0,0355 **
Trade 0,00531303 0,00280675 0,0585 * −0,00488395 0,00161360 0,0025 ***
Rating 0,284096 0,121256 0,0192 ** −0,355748 0,118101 0,0026 ***
VIX 0,00526065 0,00272891 0,0540 * −0,00452019 0,00249649 0,0818 *
TED −0,00722731 0,0426140 0,8653 −1,36084 0,446051 0,0023 ***
Average dependent variable 0,733948 SQM dependent var. 0,721028
Squared sum of residuals 515,6050 S.E. of the regression 0,441515
R2 0,627713 R2 corrected 0,625038
F (19, 2645) 234,7225 P-value(F ) 0,000000
Log-likelihood −1592,682 Akaike Criterion 3225,365
Schwarz Criterion 3343,124 HannanQuinn 3267,978
Table 4: The table shows the estimates of the coeﬃcients of the following regression
βFini,t = β0 + β
′
1Zi,t−k + γi,tCRt + vi,t,
γi,t = γ0 + γ
′
1Zi,t−k
where in the constant parameter we have introduced an Euro-Zone dummy (EZ) in order to control for ﬁxed
eﬀects at the Euro-Zone level. We report the β1and γ1 coeﬃcients, which are the coeﬃcients on the Zi,t−k
instruments that survive an encompassing approach of variable selection where each variable is kept in the
regression if either the interdependence coeﬃcient β or the crisis parameter γ of a particular variable is
statistically signiﬁcant. ***, **, and *, indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
index on the Global index and the Financial innovation and using the resid-
ual as our pure European sovereign risk measure.The results of the analysis,
available from the authors, are almost identical to the ones that we have pre-
sented.
5 Summary and Conclusions
Table 5 summarizes our main ﬁndings from a qualitative point of view. First,
during the Greek crisis market sentiment shifts against the Eurozone coun-
tries: before the crisis there is evidence of a positive Eurozone eﬀect, so that
the common currency protected its members from sovereign idiosyncratic and
32
contagion risks; however, the Euro membership becomes an handicap during
the Greek crisis, which basically turns into a Euro issue: for given fundamen-
tals EUZ countries see the perception of sovereign risk rise relative to countries
non belonging to the Euro. Second, with the exception of the vulnerability to
pure ﬁnancial risk, the role of the public debt ratio in accounting for both
contagion and idiosyncratic risks is heightened during the crisis. Third, the
real economy and the labor market become more important for sovereign risk
during the crisis: lower growth of industrial production raises a country id-
iosyncratic and contagion risks, and higher unemployment, which was had no
signiﬁcant association with sovereign risk before the crisis, becomes associated
to higher CDS spreads changes and contagion. One possible interpretation is
the political economy of ﬁscal and current account consolidation: high levels of
unemployment make ﬁscal consolidations more diﬃcult to implement and to
sustain; high unemployment is a sign of downward wage rigidity, which is also
an obstacle for restoring competitiveness. Fourth, credit rating news which
do not aﬀect sovereign spreads in normal times, have a signiﬁcant impact on
sovereign risk during the crisis.
This evidence supports the conclusion that after a long period of benign ne-
glect in the Eurozone, ﬁnancial markets have rediscovered that fundamentals
and structural fragilities impeding growth matter for sovereign risk. Over-
all, the economic variables that we choose for assessing the role of market
fundamentals go a long way in accounting for the cross-country variation in
idiosyncratic and contagion risks: they can explain between 54 and 80% of the
total cross-country variance.
These results have important implications for the appropriate pace of ad-
justment in the Euro area. First, they imply that credibility is not ev-
erything, in the sense that past economic fundamentals, as opposed to mere
policy announcements, matter: they explain most of a country's vulnerability.
This implies that policies that plunge the economy into recession backlash (re-
call that Greece, the obvious example, is not part of our empirical analysis)
The reason it is not the standard story that the recession widens the public
deﬁcit through the automatic stabilizers, and this worsens the country's sol-
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α βGlob βEur βFin
interdip crisis total interdip crisis total interdip crisis total interdip crisis total
Const  - - - - 
EUZ + +  + +  + +  + +
Ind Prod         - -
Pub Debt + + + + + + + +
Pub Deﬁcit + + + - + - -
Curr Acc - -  
Unempl + + + + + + + +
Trad Open   +  = +  + + - =
Rating - - - - + - -
VIX + - =   +   +  =
TED    
Table 5: This table summarizes the signs of the coeﬃcients associated to the diﬀerent instruments. Only
coeﬃcients which are signiﬁcant at 10% level are reported. The column total shows the sign resulting from
the sum of the interdependence coeﬃcient and the crisis parameter.
vency. The eﬀect works via a direct link from lower employment and growth to
spreads: the recession raises the perception of insolvency risk. Second, labor
market reforms may backlash if they raise unemployment in the short run.
Measures aiming at reducing hiring and ﬁring cost, for example, should be
accompanied by reforms of the wage bargaining system in order to prevent
the rise in unemployment. Third, privatizations should be part of a consolida-
tion strategy, not only because they do not adversely aﬀect the economy, but
also because, by reducing debt stock, they may calm fears of insolvency which
attach more weight to debt in the crisis
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Appendix I
The following table shows the actual composition of the three Market In-
dexes used in the model:
Global Sovereign CDS Index European Sovereign CDS Index European Financial CDS Index
Australia Germany Aegon N.V.
Japan France Allianz SE
Malaysia Ireland Assicurazioni Generali SPA
China Belgium Aviva plc
Korea Denmark AXA
Czech Republic Norway Monte dei Paschi di Siena SPA
Bulgaria Spain Banco Bilbao VA S.A.
Kazakhstan Sweden Banco Santander S.A.
Poland Netherlands Barclays Bank PLC
Russian Federation Austria BNP Parisbas
Brazil Greece Commerzbank A.
Chile Portugal Credit Agricole SA
Colombia Italy Credut Suisse Group Ltd
Peru United Kingdom Deutsche Bank A.
United Mexican States Finland Hannover Rueck AG
Abu Dhabi HSBC Bank PLC
Dubai Intesa San Paolo SPA
South Africa LLOYDS TSB Bank PLC
Israel Muenchener Rueck
Qatar Societe Generale
United Stated of America Swiss Reinsurance Company Ltd
The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc
UBS AG
Unicredit SPA
Zurich Insurance Company Ltd
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